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"DISCRIMINATION" ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION: AN




In recent years, conflicts among religion, government, and indi-
vidual rights have become increasingly litigated national issues.
The existence of traditional and nontraditional religious employers
has involved the workplace in these conflicts.' Employers who be-
lieve that religious beliefs cannot be separated from secular activi-
ties, and who therefore see all of their employment policies and
practices as an extension of their religious beliefs, present a partic-
* Tutor in Law and Research Fellow, Yale Law School. B.A., Carleton College, 1974; J.D.,
William Mitchell College of Law, 1978; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1987. I would like to thank
H. Jefferson Powell for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Lillian C. Powell
for her encouragement.
1. A recent article discussed the rise of nontraditional, particularly fundamentalist Chris-
tian, religious employers:
In the midst of a strong resurgence of forms of Christianity that adhere
strictly to the Bible, a growing number of believers are ... seeking to apply
their spiritual convictions in the workplace. "There definitely has been an in-
crease in the number of firms run with some kind of Christian orientation,"
says Sylvia Neil, Midwest legal director for the American Jewish Congress.
"It's all tied to the return back to religion that we've seen in recent years.
While outside figures aren't available because of the relative newness of the
trend, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence about its scope. A national com-
mittee of churchmen recently identified some 150 Christian workers' groups,
ranging from the Christian Dental Society to the Rodeo Riders Fellowship. At
Seattle's Boeing Co., about 200 employees in a group called Good News at
Work gather in corporate cafeterias for breakfast and lunchtime Bible studies
and inspirational talks....
"It used to be that you had to crawl up in a corner to have a Bible study,"
says Jim Hodges, founder of the Kelso, Wash.-based Hard Hats for Christ,
which ministers to itinerant construction workers. "Now there are some jobs
where you have to attend a study to be a part of the 'in' group."
Moffett, Fundamentalist Christians Strive to Apply Beliefs to the Workplace, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 4, 1985, at 33, col. 4.
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ular challenge. In a constellation of recent cases, employees have
challenged these employers under civil rights laws, contending that
such religiously permeated work environments are inherently dis-
criminatory. Employers as diverse as fundamentalist Christians,
Agudath Israel, and the Roman Catholic Church have resisted the
enforcement of state and municipal civil rights laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, marital status, or affec-
tional preference, arguing that acquiescence would be contrary to
the free exercise of the employers' religious beliefs.2
An extensive body of statutory provisions, case law, and com-
mentary has developed around the issues involved in determining
permissible religious discrimination by traditional religious institu-
tions and organizations.3 In these cases, the employer's fundamen-
tal right to implement religious beliefs or practices has been as-
sumed; the only question has been whether, in a particular case,
the employer has overstepped its legitimate boundaries in the pur-
suit of a particular employment policy or practice. Employment is-
sues involving nontraditional religious employers, however, have
provoked deeper questions. When an employer's sole identification
as a religious entity is its implementation of religious beliefs or val-
ues, what should "discrimination" on the basis of religion be?
Should the distinction, however determined, between religious and
nonreligious beliefs, practices, or policies be the line of demarca-
tion between permissible and impermissible employment prac-
tices? Is the employee, in short, entitled to a "religiously-neutral"
employment atmosphere? What is such an atmosphere? To what
extent should the state, through its civil rights laws, attempt its
creation or enforcement?
Several recent cases illustrate these questions. The first case,
State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.,4 involved fundamentalist
Christians implementing their religious beliefs and practices in the
workplace. The defendants, owners and operators of a closely-held
business corporation, ran all aspects of their business in accor-
2. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932
(6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986); State v. Sports & Health Club,
Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Under
21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985).
3. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
4. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
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dance with their religious beliefs. In employment interviews, appli-
cants were asked questions based upon the defendants' religious
beliefs and values.5 The defendants justified this inquiry as an at-
tempt to advise prospective employees of the defendants' beliefs
and to help the defendants determine if the applicants possessed
"teachable spirit[s]" and followed "disciplined life style[s]," as
Biblically defined." The management also freely discussed its reli-
gious beliefs with employees after hiring. Bible studies were held
on the premises, which were voluntary for nonmanagerial employ-
ees and mandatory for management. The defendants' religiously
based views about proper attitude and lifestyle also dominated
their termination decisions.7 Employees who violated Biblically
based work rules requiring a high degree of discipline and submis-
siveness, or who displayed "back biting" or "non-joyful" attitudes,
were terminated.'
The State of Minnesota, acting on behalf of prospective, current,
and past employees, charged that these practices constituted dis-
crimination on the basis of religion under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act.9 The defendants admitted that "their religious prac-
tices and beliefs spill[ed] over into, and in fact require[d], their
employment practices." 10 The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "[tlhe religious beliefs of the [defendants] are clearly
legitimate."'" The court also conceded that "[d]espite all the dis-
5. The court stated that "[iln those interviews, applicants were asked whether they at-
tend church, read the Bible, are married or divorced, pray, engage in pre-marital or extra-
marital sexual relations, believe in God, heaven or hell, and other questions of a religious
nature." Id. at 847. The dissent questioned the factual accuracy of this characterization of
the employer's interviews. Id. at 868-73 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 847.
7. According to the court,
[b]ased on an interpretation of the Bible, Sports and Health will not hire, and
will fire, individuals living with but not married to a person of the opposite sex;
a young, single woman working without her father's consent or a married wo-
man working without her husband's consent; a person whose commitment to a
non-Christian religion is strong; and someone who is 'antagonistic to the Bible,'
which according to Galatians 5:19-21 includes fornicators and homosexuals.
Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 846. The state also contended that these practices constituted discrimination on
the basis of sex and marital status.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 846 n.3.
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crimination allegations asserted in this case[,] Sports and Health
has employed, and continues to employ, married persons, male and
female unmarried persons, and divorced males and females of vari-
ous races."12 The defendants
have also employed, and continue to employ, persons of various
religious faiths--Jews, Roman Catholics, Protestants of various
denominations, and others-so long as such other persons are
not offended by the owners' faith, are not antagonistic toward
the Christian gospel and will comply with management's work
rules in a cheerful and obedient spirit.13
The court went on to hold, however, that all of the defendants'
religiously based employment actions constituted discrimination
on the basis of religion.14 The court enforced an injunction, issued
previously by an administrative law judge."
The court did not discuss how the particular actions of the de-
fendants constituted "discrimination" on the basis of religion.
Rather, the conclusion that discrimination occurred apparently
was based on a belief that the employment environment was so
"religiously permeated" that speech and actions, which might oth-
erwise be lawful, were unlawful in this context.' 6 One dissenting
12. Id. at 848.
13. Id. Only managerial personnel were required to be "born-again" Christians. Id. at 847.
14. Id. at 849-50. The court characterized these actions as failure to hire because of reli-
gious beliefs; "terminating employees because of a difference in religious beliefs; refusing to
promote employees because of differing religious beliefs; and failing to provide 'open' public
accommodations." Id. at 846. The last conclusion was based, in part, on evidence that one
complainant was forced to give up her membership in one of the clubs because "Sports and
Health, through its insistence on displaying fundamentalist Christian religious literature in
the literature racks and on the walls of the sports club, engaged in conduct that was offen-
sive to her." Id. at 849.
15. The injunction prohibited the defendants from refusing to hire any person because of
that person's religious beliefs or practices; refusing to hire any person because of that per-
son's objection or hostility to the defendants' religious beliefs or practices, or to the religious
beliefs or practices of any other employee; taking any adverse action against any employee
because of that employee's religious beliefs or practices; refusing to take into management
any person based upon that person's religious beliefs or practices; requiring, soliciting, or
suggesting that any employee attend Bible studies or participate in any other religious exer-
cise or practice; or taking any adverse action against any employee who objected or was
hostile to the religious practices or exercises of management or of any other employee. Id. at
867 n.25 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., id. at 850.
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judge questioned the adequacy of this analysis. In discussing the
alleged illegality of the preemployment interviews, he stated:
There is remarkable vagueness in the [hearing] examiner's as-
sessment of questions ... about reading the Bible, prayer, and
church attendance. None of them identif[ies] a particular reli-
gion, although they concededly may distinguish the religious
from the nonreligious. If, however, it is impermissible to ask
whether a person reads the Bible, which is itself a library of
books, would it be impermissible to inquire whether a person
has read such other classics as John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress
or John Milton's Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained? Or would
a conversation about... Faith & Ferment ... be impermissible
in an employment context? 17
The [hearing] examiner's disposition of the basic issue in this
case was as sweeping as it was superficial: [the defendant's] reli-
gious beliefs are sincere but, when put into practice in a com-
mercial service business, simply irrelevant. To say, as the exam-
iner said, that "[t]he essence of the employer's business is not a
'discipleship for Christ' . . . but rather the operation of an exer-
cise emporium" is impermissibly to substitute the examiner's
business judgment for [the defendants'] business judgment. The
examiner.., decrees a dichotomy between [the defendants'] be-
liefs and practices, divorces the sacred from the secular, does
not distinguish praying on one's knees on Sunday from preying
on other persons in the marketplace on Monday, and perceives
no significant difference between the commitment of conviction
and the detachment of a possibly more casual Sabbath cere-
mony or community convention.'
In the second case, Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan As-
sociation,19 an atheist employed as a teller in the defendant's insti-
17. Id. at 870 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 859 (footnote omitted). Judge Yetka also dissented:
Here is an act which has as its stated purpose the elimination of discrimina-
tion in employment. It has been rightly invoked to protect minorities-in
color, gender, and religion. Yet, it would discriminate against the majority reli-
gion in the United States since the nation's founding, namely, Christianity.
This decision would deny a Christian the right to practice his belief in the
marketplace.... I find the findings so repugnant that it reaches the stage of
being ridiculous.
Id. at 876 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
19. 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tution refused to attend monthly staff meetings that were opened
with a short religious talk and a prayer delivered by a local minis-
ter. She contended that these activities were offensive to her, and
that compelled attendance constituted employment discrimination
on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff was "discharged on account of her
religious beliefs," in violation of the Act.2 The majority failed to
explain how, or why, the facts gave rise to religious discrimination,
focusing instead on whether the defendant's efforts at accommoda-
tion of the plaintiff's beliefs were legally sufficient. 2 The dissent-
ing judge apparently also assumed that religious discrimination oc-
curred. He stated that he
would not hesitate for a moment . . . in finding an employer
liable for imposing or attempting to impose "forced religious
conformity" . . . . [T]o prove discrimination here Mrs. Young
needed to show that her employer required or tolerated prac-
tices so inconsistent with her religious beliefs that she could not
continue working and remain true to those beliefs."
Two reported decisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission reflect a similar approach. In the first case, 4 the em-
ployer conducted weekly religious meetings on its premises and
during regular working hours. The employer required the attend-
ance of all employees, regardless of their religious persuasions. Af-
20. Id. at 141-42.
21. Id. at 143-44.
22. Id. at 144-45. The issue of religious accommodation arose in connection with the em-
ployer's defense. The court stated that
[s]ince we have concluded that Mrs. Young made out a prima facie case of
religious discrimination. . . we must now determine whether Southwestern
presented evidence sufficient to rebut plaintiff's showing of unlawful employ-
ment practices. At the time of plaintiff's termination, Southwestern had an
obligation to accommodate her religious beliefs and observances unless it could
show that "an undue hardship" to its business rendered the accommodation of
Mrs. Young's objections unreasonable.
The court found that the defendant's attempts at accommodation were insufficiently com-
municated to her. Id.
23. Id. at 145 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). In his view, the testimony of management that
attendance at the devotional portions of the meeting was not required resulted in the plain-
tiff's failure to show that she was constructively discharged. Id. at 145-46.
24. Decision No. 72-0528, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 434 (1971).
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ter one such meeting, a supervisor reprimanded two employees for
failing to attend. One employee witnessed the reprimand and
voiced her objection to the supervisor; she was later discharged.
She brought suit under Title VII, claiming that she was discharged
"because of her religious beliefs and because she attempted to de-
fend the civil rights of employees. '2 5 The Commission agreed, stat-
ing in conclusory terms that the employer fired her "at least in
part because of her religion.., and also because she opposed prac-
tices made unlawful under Title VII."'26 In the other case,2 7 a su-
pervisor occasionally discussed his religious convictions with em-
ployees. Two employees alleged that the employer "violated Title
VII by allowing their supervisor to preach religion while on the
job."28 The Commission found that the two employees, "subjec-
tively, felt intimidated by the conduct of their supervisor. '29 It
concluded that the first employee, "whether erroneously or not, be-
lieved that his job security could be affected by his reaction" to his
supervisor's views,30 and that the second employee "believed that
his supervisor was attempting to 'convert' him. '3 1 The Commission
held that "Title VII obligates an employer to maintain a working
atmosphere free of intimidation based upon race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.... Respondent's failure to provide a work-
ing environment free of religious intimidation is violative . . . of
Title VII. ' '32
In another recent Title VII case,33 the plaintiff was told, when he
began work, that Metals Trades was a "Christian company" and
that its business manual was the Bible. At the time, he was eager
to work for a company with a Christian orientation, because he was
an evangelical Christian. His subsequent job performance was less
than satisfactory, however, and he was fired. The district court
found that the religious beliefs shared by the plaintiff and the
25. Id. at 434.
26. Id. at 435.
27. Decision No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842 (1972).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 843.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citation omitted).
33. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985).
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company's owners were an element of their personal relationship,
and that the deterioration of this personal relationship led to the
plaintiff's termination. The court agreed that religion was an im-
portant aspect of the parties' relationship, but held that the plain-
tiff's termination did not constitute discrimination on the basis of
religion. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that "religion played a role in [the plain-
tiff's] discharge .... [He was] treated . . . differently at different
times depending upon [his] current religious views. This is the es-
sence of discrimination." 5 According to the appellate court,
"[w]hen an employer expresses an enhanced tolerance of an em-
ployee's performance because of his religion, but lowers its level of
tolerance when the employee's previously agreeable religious views
change, the employer has engaged in intentional differential treat-
ment based on religion. '3 6
What is striking about these cases, and others like them, is their
underlying assumption that the implementation of religious poli-
cies, practices, or values by the employer is inherently discrimina-
tory. Little analysis is offered as to what constitutes, in this partic-
ular context, "discrimination" on the basis of religion. Rather,
courts simply assume that a discriminatory practice has occurred.
This assumption has two parts:
1. That individual decision making can be "religiously neutral,"
or free of religious influence.
2. That absent statutory or constitutional exemption, the imple-
mentation of religious beliefs, policies, or practices by the employer
in the workplace is discrimination on the basis of religion and
should be prohibited.
This Article examines these assumptions. It concludes that the
state cannot and should not choose between permissible or imper-
missible employment philosophies or practices based upon their
religious or nonreligious source. The civil rights laws never in-
tended to eradicate religious values from individual decision mak-
ing, or from the workplace. Indeed, such eradication is an impossi-
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 709. The case was remanded, however, for determination of whether "even in
the absence of discrimination," the plaintiff would have been discharged. Id. at 713.
[Vol. 30:581
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ble task, fraught with discriminatory potential. An employer's
implementation of religious policies or practices should be consid-
ered discriminatory only when it precludes an employee, because
of his or her religious affiliation or identity, from equal employ-
ment opportunity. To the extent that an employee further objects
to exposure to a religious work environment or work rules, his or
her claim should be handled under general rules governing an em-
ployer's duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. Any
other approach is based upon a false assumption that "religious
neutrality" in employment can or should be achieved as a matter
of public policy.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
Federal,s7 state, and local statutes and ordinances, ss as well as
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
37. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
Title VII provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2.
Originally, Title VII applied only to private employers. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. In 1972, Congress increased the scope of its
protection to include federal, state, and local governmental employers. See Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Title VII).
The 1972 amendments also included a definition of religion and placed an affirmative obli-
gation on employers to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious practices. See id.
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982)).
38. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (1985);
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402 (Supp. 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 760.10 (West 1984); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (Supp.
1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-
1-2 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6 (West 1988); KA. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009
(1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344-040 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1006
(West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16
(1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MCH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 37-2202 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
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United States Constitution,39 have long afforded employees protec-
tion against discrimination on the basis of religion. The primary
213.055 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1104 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613-330 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1984 &
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1987);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 1980 &
Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659-030 (1985);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1988-89); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (1986 & Supp.
1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-10
(1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401 (1985); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221K, § 5.01
(Vernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1987 &
Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §2.1-716 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp.
1988); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 27-
9-105 (1987).
For an older, but still useful, analysis of state and municipal fair employment laws, see
Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: Employ-
ers, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 907 (1967).
39. An employee may bring an action for violation of the equal protection clause against
some governmental employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides a federal cause
of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person of
any federal constitutional or statutory right. Lower federal courts are divided on the ques-
tion of whether Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for causes of action that fall within
the scope of that statute. See Gudel, Title VII Preemption of Employment Discrimination
Actions Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 1987 ILL. B.J. 910. Commentators have argued that
suit under § 1983 should be required only when the federal right that the employer allegedly
violated is a right created by Title VII. See id.; Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress
Discrimination in Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. U.L.
REV. 93 (1985).
Violations of the equal protection clause may also be actionable in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982), which provides a remedy against conspiracies to deprive any person
of "the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws."
This statute provides a remedy against private conspiracies to violate constitutional rights.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96 (1971). However, when Title VII creates the sub-
stantive rights that form the basis of the action under § 1985(3), the plaintiff must proceed
under that statute. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378
(1979). It is unclear, under Novotny, whether this statutory preemption applies to situations
in which the substantive rights involved are theoretically covered by Title VII but a viola-
tion of that statute is not alleged. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
Court's decision does not affect the use of § 1985(3) to redress violations of preexisting
constitutional rights. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring). Compare Trigg v. Fort Wayne Com-
munity Schools, 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff may sue for violation of the four-
teenth amendment through § 1985(3), even if the same facts suggest a violation of Title
VII), with Culler v. South Carolina Dep't. of Social Serv., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1590 (D.S.C. 1984) (Novotny precludes use of § 1985(3) to bring what is essentially a Title
VII claim).
Section 1981 does not afford a remedy for discrimination on the basis of religion. Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
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federal statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment
is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act").40 Because
the vast majority of federal employment discrimination claims
raising religious issues have been brought under this statute,41 and
the elements of proof under state civil rights laws are usually quite• 42
similar, this Article will examine the provisions of Title VII as
illustrative.43
By enacting Title VII, Congress "clearly targeted the elimination
of all forms of discrimination as a 'highest priority.' ",44 The Act
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or pro-
spective employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.45 The three primary theories of employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII are: disparate treatment, disparate impact
of otherwise neutral policies or practices, and the perpetuation of
the effects of past discrimination through the use of facially neu-
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. See supra note 37.
41. Proof of a disparate treatment claim brought under the equal protection clause and §
1983 is, in any event, very similar to that required under Title VII. See Williams v. Ander-
son, 562 F.2d 1081, 1086-88 (8th Cir. 1977).
42. See state statutes supra note 38.
43. The statutory scheme of Title VII contemplates the enactment of complementary
state laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) & (d) (1982) (complainant must exhaust availa-
ble state remedies prior to commencement of federal proceedings). State laws are preempted
by the federal system only to the extent that they are inconsistent with the purpose of the
federal statutes or purport to require or permit an act which would constitute an unlawful
employment practice under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982). See also Shehadeh v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ridinger v. General Motors
Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1972).
44. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing S.
REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See supra note 37. The only definition of "religion" found in
the Act is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). This definition, which by its context appears to
be limited to accommodation questions, states:
(i) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and prac-
tice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103.
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tral devices.4" An employer may defend on the ground that its ac-
tion, although discriminatory under one of these theories, is re-
quired by business necessity or is a bona fide occupational
qualification. The defense of business necessity, most well known
in the context of an adverse impact theory,47 can be a defense in
disparate treatment cases as well.48 Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII
provides that an employer may consider religion, sex, or national
origin when one of those characteristics is a bona fide occupational
46. The essence of a disparate treatment claim is that the employer has treated the claim-
ant less favorably than another because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The
order and allocation of proof are as follows: (1) the plaintiff must present evidence that is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant must then
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action; and (3) the
plaintiff must then prove that the assigned reason is a pretext or is discriminatory in its
application. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). See also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-57 (1981).
The other two theories of employment discrimination are described in B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1983). The Supreme Court first
enunciated the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Under this theory, the plaintiff must show that a facially neutral employment practice has a
significantly adverse impact on a protected group. Once that showing is made, the burden
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the practice has a manifest relationship to the
employment in question and is justified by business necessity. If the employer meets this
burden, the plaintiff may then show that other practices, which lack a similarly discrimina-
tory effect, would satisfy the employer's legitimate interests. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32. Proof of discriminatory motive is not
required under a disparate impact theory. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
335 n.15. The third theory-perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination through de-
vices that are neutral on their face-also assumes a lack of any intent to discriminate on the
part of the employer. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E. D. Va.
1968).
47. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-
32.
48. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248; Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1268-69
(9th Cir. 1980); Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
"Business necessity" has been variously defined as an employment practice that is "neces-
sary to safe and efficient job performance," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14
(1977), that has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question," Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 432, or that "substantially promote[s] the proficient operation of the business," Chrisner
v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981). In disparate treatment
cases, courts often treat business necessity as part of a defense based upon a claim of bona
fide occupational qualification. See, e.g., Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1199
(N.D. Tex. 1983), afl'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
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qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business.49
Religious discrimination claims generally fall into one of three
broad categories: the employee seeks exemption from "neutral"
work rules because of the requirements of his or her religious be-
liefs; the employee claims that he or she has been treated less fa-
vorably than others because of his or her religious affiliation or be-
liefs; or the employee challenges the employer's implementation of
religious beliefs or practices on the ground that they constitute dis-
crimination on the basis of religion. Cases of the first type are
based upon statutory requirements that an employer make a rea-
sonable effort to accommodate its employees' religious beliefs.50
Cases of the second and third types can be brought under any of
the three primary theories of employment discrimination: dispa-
rate treatment, perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination
through the use of facially neutral devices, or disparate impact of
otherwise neutral policies or practices upon members of a pro-
tected class. Religious discrimination cases based on the em-
ployer's implementation of religious beliefs or practices may also
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The Supreme Court characterized the B.F.O.Q. defense as
"an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination." Dothard, 433
U.S. at 334. See also Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (D.
Kan. 1971) (legislative history of this section indicates that the exception for bona fide occu-
pational qualifications is to be construed narrowly).
50. See, e.g., § 701(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). To establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination under this section, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) he
has a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement is contrary to his
religious faith; (2) he informed his employer or prospective employer about the conflict; and
(3) he was denied employment, or privileges of employment, because of his refusal to com-
ply with the employment requirement. See Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736
F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir.
1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). The question then becomes whether the employer
can accommodate the requirements of the employee's religious beliefs without undue hard-
ship. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). An accommodation
causes "undue hardship" whenever it results in "more than a de minimis cost to the em-
ployer." Id. See also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (undue
hardship is at issue only when the employer claims that he is unable to offer reasonable
accommodation without such hardship).
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involve a failure to accommodate the employee's conflicting reli-
gious, or nonreligious, needs."
Available defenses in religious discrimination cases include the
general defenses of business necessity and bona fide occupational
qualification.5 2 In addition, if the employer is a religious institu-
tion,53 other defenses may be available. When the employer is a
church or other religious institution, and the employee is a mem-
ber of the clergy, courts generally hold employment issues to be
ecclesiastical matters beyond the authority of the civil courts. 4
Courts base this decision on the free exercise and establishment
51. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975)
(employer's requirement that plaintiff attend staff meetings that included religious content
challenged on the basis that it constituted a failure to accommodate the plaintiff's atheist
beliefs). This approach, however, is far more cumbersome for the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must show each policy or practice of the employer to be contrary to his or her beliefs-a
daunting task when the working environment is pervasively religious. In addition, massive
systemic changes in the employer's management philosophy or operations would almost al-
ways exceed the de minimis burden required to defeat a claim for accommodation. See
supra note 50. Cf. EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 92-93 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(Title VII does not permit maintenance of a case based upon disparate impact when the
claim is the employer's failure to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs, because § 701
sets forth the exclusive method of proof for this claim).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
53. The statutory definition of "employer" contains no exemption for religious organiza-
tions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
54. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952)
("[1]egislation that regulates church... appointment of clergy... prohibits the free exercise
of religion"); Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) ("[iun the ab-
sence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise"); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 710 (1871) ("civil courts... may not take cogni-
zance of purely spiritual or ecclesiastical questions"); Simpson v. Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d
490, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). Civil courts or regulatory agencies may have authority to deter-
mine whether the defendant is a religious organization or whether the employee's dismissal
implicated ecclesiastical matters. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (a state civil rights commission does not violate the
constitutional rights of a religious organization by "merely investigating the circumstances"
of a lay employee's discharge, "if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based rea-
son was in fact the reason for the discharge"); Ninth & 0 Street Baptist Church v. EEOC,
616 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Ky. 1985), afl'd, 802 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1986); Note, Serving God or
Caesar: Constitutional Limits on the Regulation of Religious Employers, 51 Mo. L. REv.
779, 782-84 (1986).
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clauses of the first amendment.55 If the employee is a lay worker
employed by a religious institution, the first amendment implica-
tions depend on the employee's function. If the employee performs
essentially nonreligious or secular tasks, civil courts will review the
claim.56 If, however, the lay employee performs religious duties,
courts have held that the first amendment precludes interference
by civil authorities.57
55. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94; McClure, 460 F.2d 553; NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S.
490 (1979) (application of the National Labor Relations Act to religious schools implicates
the guarantees of the religion clauses). See also Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); Note, supra note 54, at 786. The overriding concern in such
cases seems to be the reluctance of the civil courts to become involved in matters of church
doctrine, orthodoxy, or internal management. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426
U.S. at 713 ("religious controversies [such as the dismissal of clergy] are not the proper
subject of civil court inquiry, and ... a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decision of
church tribunals as it finds them"); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (calling for a "spirit of freedom
for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation-in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine").
56. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th
Cir. 1981) (labor dispute with maintenance workers did not implicate first amendment con-
cerns because the workers, although ordained ministers, were "not engaged in activities tra-
ditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); Dolter v.
Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (assertion of Title VII
jurisdiction over a lay teacher's claim of sex discrimination would not entail excessive entan-
glement in the religious mission of defendant's school, because it would not entangle the
court in defendant's religious mission, doctrines, or activities); Whitney v. Greater N.Y.
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discharge of
clerk-typists does not implicate first amendment concerns, because the discharge was not
based on doctrinal policies of the church, and no other evidence indicated the involvement
of ecclesiastical concerns). Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290 (1985) (the first amendment does not bar application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to the commercial activities of a religious foundation); Denver Post of the Nat'l Soc'y of the
Volunteers of America v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (exercise of jurisdiction by
the NLRB over the social service employees of a religious organization would not threaten
first amendment guarantees when the organization did not require the employees to have
any particular religious background or training, no religious activities were conducted at the
program's facilities, neither clients nor employees were the subject of religious proselytiza-
tion, and the employees testified that religion played no part in their work).
57. See, e.g., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d at 284 (Title VII
does not apply to the relationship between a theological seminary and its teachers, who act
as intermediaries between the central church authorities and local Baptist churches, and
who instruct seminarians in religious doctrine); Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp.
1499, 1507 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (first amendment precludes civil court adjudication of whether
an individual is qualified to teach in the theology department of a religious university),
aff'd, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987). Cf. Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp.
596 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:581
Traditional religious employers are also the beneficiaries of spe-
cial statutory exemptions under Title VII. Section 702 permits "a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or soci-
ety" to employ persons of a particular religion for the performance
of work "connected with the carrying on by such [organization] ...
of its activities." ' Courts interpret this section as a limited exemp-
tion, for religious discrimination alone; discrimination on another
basis (race, color, sex, national origin) is not protected.59 The sec-
tion's scope encompasses employees who are engaged in both reli-
gious and nonreligious work. 0 Under section 703(e)(2), an em-
724, 729 (D. Md. 1980) (if a priest was granted tenure instead of plaintiff (a lay teacher)
because of the defendant's religious policies, application of Title VII could violate the first
amendment). One commentator has suggested that a compelling governmental interest must
justify any intrusion by civil courts into a religious institution's employment relationships.
See Laycock, supra note 55, at 1417.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
59. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1982);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972); Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 268-69. A problem, as yet unresolved, arises when discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin is a part of a religious organization's
beliefs. See Note, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Or-
ganizations: A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1375 (1987). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983)
(religiously based policy of racial discrimination must yield to compelling governmental in-
terest in eradicating racial discrimination in education).
60. Origmaly, section 702 provided that the Act's prohibitions "shall not apply to... a
religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, or society of its religious activities." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)) (emphasis added). The
word "religious" before the word "activities" was deleted by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history surrounding
this amendment, see Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 803-12 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2862
(1987). Existing legislative history shows that the change was intended to allow religious
organizations to discriminate against employees on religious grounds with respect to all of
their activities, not just those that are religious in nature. The legislative purpose behind the
change was to prevent the involvement of government in religious affairs. See id.
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of this section, as
applied to the employees of nonprofit religious organizations. Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
The Court limited its holding, however, to nonprofit activities; the constitutionality of its
application to profit-making activities of religious organizations was left undecided. See id.
at 2870; id. at 2875 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ployer may employ persons of a particular religion if the employer
is an educational institution that is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion
or a particular religious organization, or if the curriculum of the
institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular reli-
gion."' This exemption, like section 702, is not restricted to the re-
ligious activities of these institutions or their employees. Any ac-
tivities, no matter how secular, are exempt from the purview of the
Act.62
Traditional and nontraditional religious employers may also
claim protection under the free exercise or establishment clause of
the first amendment.6 3 If the employer is an artificial person, a
threshold question is whether it can claim a constitutional right
under the first amendment. A nonprofit religious corporation or as-
sociation engaged in religious activities has clear first amendment
rights to free exercise and to freedom from excessive government
involvement in its operations.6 The answer is less clear when the
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). One court held that when a university defends an employ-
ment discrimination suit under this section, it must prove "that all or a considerable
amount of its support, control, or management comes from or is in the hands of the religious
society." Pime v. Loyola Univ., 585 F. Supp. 435, 440 (N.D. Ill, 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351
(7th Cir. 1986).
62. One court refused to find an establishment clause violation on this ground. Larsen v.
Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985) (protection offered to thrift stores
that operated as a division of the Mormon Church's Welfare Services Department), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987); State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985),
dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). For a statement of the free exercise or
establishment clause analysis to be applied in this context, see Bagni, Discrimination in the
Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79
COLUN. L. REv. 1514 (1979) (free exercise and establishment); Bassett, Religion and Reli-
gious Institutions: The Rising Din of Litigation, 20 U.S.F. L. Rav. 775, 812 (1986) (free
exercise); Laycock, supra note 55 (free exercise).
The employer may also contend that its speech, in connection with its employment ac-
tions, is protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment. See, e.g., Sports &
Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 846 (the employer unsuccessfully asserted freedom of
speech as a defense to the application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act). See also Mar-
shall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. Rv.
545 (1983) (discussing the extent to which the freedom of expression guarantee pervades the
area of religious exercise).
64. See Laycock, supra note 55, at 1386, and cases cited therein (holding that no viable
distinction exists between individuals and religious institutions in the assertion of free exer-
cise rights). Cf. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Con-
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employer is a religious organization involved in commercial activi-
ties,65 or a profit-making enterprise run by religiously oriented in-
dividuals.6 Because the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized first amendment rights of corporations in another context,67
the better answer is that such employers can assert defenses based
upon the religion clauses as long as they can show the requisite
connection to religious mission or religious exercise.6 8
Consideration thus far has been limited to cases involving claims
of unlawful religious discrimination. Religious issues may also arise
when the plaintiff claims to be a victim of discrimination on an-
other basis (race, color, sex, national origin, or-in the case of some
state laws or municipal ordinances-marital status or affectional
preference), and the employer responds with a religious defense
based upon constitutional guarantees or statutory exceptions or ex-
emptions. For instance, an employer accused of sex discrimination
may claim that it bases employment criteria on a religiously
grounded business necessity or bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion;6" that it is a religious institution entitled to the statutory ex-
stitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 766 (1986) (arguing that all institutional claims to free exer-
cise should be rejected, because "[b]y their nature, institutions cannot have a conscience or
faith" and "institutional exemptions could easily be used to disguise other, secular motiva-
tions for institutional conduct.").
65. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985)
(application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a religious foundation will not violate the
establishment clause when the Act's requirements apply only to commercial activities un-
dertaken with a "business purpose," and therefore have no impact on the foundation's evan-
gelical activities); cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2873 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is
... conceivable that some for-profit activities could have a religious character, so that reli-
gious discrimination with respect to these activities would be justified in some cases.").
66. See Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 850-51. The court framed the issue as
whether a profit-making corporation has "standing" to assert the first amendment as a de-
fense to claims of discrimination. Although indicating an affirmative answer, the court de-
clined to explicitly decide the question because the administrative hearing examiner pierced
the "corporate veil" to impose liability on the individual owners of the closely held corpora-
tion. Under these circumstances, those individuals clearly had a right to assert a first
amendment defense. See id.
67. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (corporate
free speech). See also Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions,
91 YALE L.J. 522, 537 & n.75 (1982) (employer's free speech rights).
68. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303-06.
69. See, e.g., Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
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emptions from liability provided by sections 70270 and 703(e)(2) of
Title VII; 1 or that its actions are protected by the free exercise or
establishment clause. 2
Religious issues in employment discrimination cases, therefore,
may arise as part of the plaintiff's case or as part of the defense.
The plaintiff often bases his or her case on the claim that religious
discrimination resulted from the employer's implementation of re-
ligious beliefs or practices. That claim, and the courts' response to
it, have reflected certain assumptions about the nature of religion
and its role in the workplace. This Article now turns to those
issues.
II. RELIGION AND NEUTRAL VALUES: THE MYTH OF "VALUE
NEUTRALITY" IN EMPLOYMENT
In Sports & Health Club, Inc., Young, Blalock, and the EEOC
cases, it was assumed that a functional difference exists between
the implementation of religious and nonreligious values in the
workplace, and that this functional difference could be used to
identify discriminatory employment practices. In short, courts as-
70. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981);
EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984), afl'd, 781 F.2d 1362
(9th Cir. 1986); Dolter, 483 F. Supp. 266. Some courts have resolved these cases by stating
broadly that § 702 only exempts religious employers from religious discrimination, not from
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, or national origin; when the plaintiff's claim is
not based upon religious discrimination, § 702 is automatically inapplicable. See, e.g., Ritter
v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724, 726-27 (D. Md. 1980). This distinction ig-
nores the fact that actions that are discriminatory on another basis may be an exercise of
the employer's religious beliefs. See supra notes 59, 60. Cf. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at
485-86 (factual inquiry into the basis of the employer's action is necessary for the applica-
tion of § 702).
71. See Ritter, 495 F. Supp. 724.
72. See, e.g., Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (claim of sex discrimination
and retaliatory discharge); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d
277 (5th Cir. 1981) (application of Title VII reporting requirements), cert denied, 456 U.S.
905 (1982); Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (claim of sex discrimination). First
amendment free exercise claims have also been raised as a defense to state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932,
944-61 (6th Cir. 1985) (claim of sex discrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619
(1986); McLeod v. Providence Christian School, 160 Mich. App. 333, 408 N.W.2d 146, 150-
52 (1987) (claim of sex discrimination); State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1985) (claims of discrimination based upon sex and marital status, as well as reli-
gion), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
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sumed that values the state enforces, through legislation, are "neu-
tral," and that religious values lack that neutrality. The employers
in those cases challenged that assumption, as have other individu-
als and employers."3 Although the full range of this debate is far
beyond the scope or purpose of this Article,7 several observations
are necessary.
The formulation of a workable definition of religion has
presented an unparalleled conundrum for the courts.75 Early opin-
ions viewed religion in traditional, theistic terms.76 United States
v. Ballard77 signalled a movement toward a far broader approach.
In Ballard, the Supreme Court indicated that the boundaries of
religious belief were subjective, understood and defined only by the
individual adherent:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief,
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to main-
tain theories of life and of death and the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of orthodox faiths.... Men may believe
what they cannot prove .... Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the
fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean
that they can be made suspect before the law.71
73. See Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 859-62 (Peterson, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing current views of Christian religious beliefs and secular life); Note, Religious Exemp-
tions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350,
364 n.81 (1980) (Jehovah's Witnesses and Jews, among others, see a broad role for religious
beliefs in areas of life often considered to be secular).
74. See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1579 (1987).
75. Most of these efforts have occurred in the course of the interpretation of the first
amendment.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dis-
senting) ("The essence of religion is a belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation."); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("The
term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obliga-
tions they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.");
see generally Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of Reli-
gion, 61 Tax. L. REv. 139, 143 (1982).
77. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
78. Id. at 86-87 (citation omitted).
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Later, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 7  the Court held that the first
amendment did not permit the state to favor believers in theistic
religions over nonbelievers or subscribers to nontheistic religions.
In a now-famous footnote, the Court stated that "[a]mong religions
in this country which do not teach what would generally be consid-
ered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethi-
cal Culture, Secular Humanism and others."80 The Court subse-
quently defined religious belief, in the context of statutory
interpretation,sl as a belief that is "sincere and meaningful" and
"occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by the orthodox belief in God. 8s2 A belief meets this test when it is
"based upon a power or a being, or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." 3
Since the advent of these cases, scholars have attempted to cap-
ture the essence of religion, which they believed to be hidden
somewhere in these tests. One commentator proposed that religion
be defined as an individual's "ultimate concern," which might be
political, economic, or cultural.8 4 Another defined religious belief as
"the affirmation of some truth, reality, or value" that "address[ed]
itself to basic questions to which man has always sought an an-
swer, questions about the meaning of human existence, the origin
of being, the meaning of suffering and death, and the existence of a
spiritual reality."8 5 Yet another suggested that religion consists of
beliefs or practices based on a perception of reality composed of
both "sacred" (that which transcends experience in the natural en-
vironment) and "profane" (natural) elements.86 Although all of
these definitions are admirable attempts to delimit the outer
79. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
80. Id. at 495 n.11.
81. At issue was the meaning of the phrase "religious training and belief" as used in the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13
(1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1982)).
82. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
83. Id. at 176. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court stated that religious
belief is more than personal philosophic conviction. Id. at 215-16. However, the Court did
not explain just how religious beliefs differ from philosophical ones.
84. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1071
(1978).
85. Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER
3, 10 (D. Gianella ed. 1965).
86. See Note, supra note 76, at 164-65.
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boundaries of a difficult concept, they do little to illuminate the
difference between religion and other "secular," philosophical or
moral, belief systems.8s
Problems in the formulation of a definition of religion are en-
demic to pluralist conceptions of state toleration of a wide diver-
sity of religious beliefs. One tenet of American pluralism involves
attempted state neutrality with regard to religious beliefs and
practices. With few exceptions, courts have left the definition or
existence of religious beliefs to the individual adherent."" This ap-
proach has been founded on notions of individual freedom and au-
tonomy, 9 and on a recognition that state evaluation of the validity
of asserted religious beliefs would run afoul of prohibitions against
state-imposed orthodoxy90 and would involve the courts in the dif-
87. For criticisms of these efforts, see Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pirr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Freeman, The Misguided
Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Note,
supra note 76.
Administrative and judicial efforts to define "religion" in the employment context have
been no less imprecise. The EEOC defines religion, for the purposes of Title VII, as "moral
or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views." 29 C.F.R § 1605.1 (1987). One court stated that to determine
what is religious within the meaning of the statute, the proper questions are (1) whether the
belief or practice asserted is "religious" in the "person's own scheme of things," and (2)
whether it is "sincerely held." Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir.
1978).
88. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. But cf. Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d
390, 395 (5th Cir.) (first amendment religious protection is not extended to "so-called reli-
gions that tend to mock established institutions and are obviously shams and absurdities
and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003
(1974); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (plaintiff's "personal religious
creed" which required the ingestion of "Kozy Kitten Cat Food" held to be a personal prefer-
ence not entitled to protection.), aff'd without opinion, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 LAW & CONTzMP. PROBs. 23, 28 (1981) ("[A] liberal
society has a permanent bias in favor of neutrality .... The liberal state aims only at equal
liberty for all under impartial general laws .... Any attempt by society or its agent, the
state, to make the decision for them must be rejected as an effort by some citizens to impose
their conception of excellence, virtue or happiness on others."). See also West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . ."); Weiss, Privilege, Pos-
ture and Protection "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 622 (1964) (assessment of the
validity of religious beliefs intrudes into individual religious freedom).
90. Any definition of religion risks "establishing a notion respecting religion" in violation
of the establishment clause. See Weiss, supra note 89, at 604. One commentator has de-
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ficult and unseemly task of external validation.9' Although this ap-
proach may have been workable in a time of more commonly
shared religious beliefs and traditions, the decline of such shared
assumptions has led to an ever-broadening-and thin-
ning-concept of the religious.92
The expansion of the concept of the religious has led to an in-
creasing merger of the "religious" and the "secular" spheres. If re-
ligious beliefs have little in the way of irreducible content and are,
in fact, left to individual identification or definition, little differen-
tiates religious beliefs or values from secular ones, including those
reflected in legislation or enforced by the state. "Value neutrality,"
in the sense of assured eradication of religious values or beliefs,
becomes a perpetually elusive concept."
scribed the permissible conception of religion under pluralist principles as "a diffuse
religiosity."
[We] are allowed, and may be encouraged, to bolster our positions by reference
to a deity. But we cannot derive policy positions from religion.... The plural-
ist theory of the establishment clause prevents this from happening by provid-
ing innumerable locations in which people can create or verify their relation-
ship to a god whom they imagine in many different ways.
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 728-29 (1986).
91. As former Chief Justice Burger stated, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logi-
cal, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection."
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indep. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). See
also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[I]t is no business of courts to say...
what is a religious practice or activity . . . ."). Complete inability to judge the quality of
asserted religious belief, however, would lead to the equally problematic result of the courts'
acceptance of all beliefs without inquiry. See Note, Religious Discrimination in the Work-
place: A Comparison of Thomas v. Review Board and Title VII Cases, 33 SYRACUS- L. REv.
843, 861-62 (1982).
92. See Canavan, supra note 89, at 24-25; cf. Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Val-
ues: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CoNrTEM'. PROBS. 3 (1981):
Although moral values are notoriously elusive of investigation, it... appears to
be the case that until the 1960's Americans held to a fairly general consensus
on such values, a consensus which was celebrated in political and civic rhetoric,
extolled from a wide variety of pulpits, honored in the mass media, and to a
great extent perpetuated through formal education, both public and pri-
vate .... However dishonored in practice, these virtues received consistent
public affirmation, and were usually thought of as based on religious belief.
Id.
The Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious organiza-
tions in the United States.
93. Any concept of the public good, recognized by government, destroys the notion of
complete state neutrality between competing values. See Canavan, supra note 89, at 29-31,
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The difficulties inherent in the use of value neutrality or "reli-
gious neutrality" as a viable concept for the evaluation of state ac-
tion hold true for the evaluation of private conduct as well. Under
any of the "religion tests" described above, the creation of a "relig-
iously neutral" work environment would be a virtual impossibility.
A belief system that "occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God, '9 4 or that con-
stitutes the individual's "ultimate concern," 95 could conceivably
encompass any value system, including one based entirely on eco-
nomic criteria. Perhaps the Supreme Court's famous footnote in
Torcaso presents the ultimate extension of the problem. 6 If, as the
Court indicated, nontheistic belief systems such as Taoism, Ethical
Culture, and Secular Humanism are religions, it would be difficult
to conceive of an employment environment or set of work rules
that would not be some sort of "religious" choice. Secular human-
ism includes the rejection of supernaturalism, the assertion of the
dignity and worth of each human being, and commitment to the
achievement of individual self-realization and human welfare
through human effort.9 7 Devotions addressed to a deity, then,
would not be the sole subject of complaint. A philosophy encourag-
ing employees to believe in themselves or to look within themselves
A pluralist society must perforce strive to be neutral about many things that
concern its divided citizens. But it cannot be neutral about all of them. If it
tries or pretends to be neutral about certain issues,. . . [it] becomes a shell
game by which people are tricked into consenting to changes in basic social
standards and institutions on the pretense that nothing more is asked of them
than respect for the rights of individuals. Much more, however, is involved: on
the fundamental issues of social life, one side or the other always wins.
94. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
95. Note, supra note 84, at 1071.
96. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961). See supra text accompanying note
80.
97. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1536 n.5 (9th Cir.) (Camby,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985). The Supreme Court's inclusion in Torcaso
of secular humanism as an example of a nontheistic religion has sparked intense debate. See
id. at 1536-37 (Camby, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Board of Comm'rs., 655 F. Supp.
939 (S.D. Ala.) (parents claim that public school textbooks advance the religion of secular
humanism), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Pfeffer, Issues That Divide: The Triumph
of Secular Humanism, 19 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 203, 207 (1977) ("strong, if somewhat indefin-
able, spirit of secular humanism.., permeates American cultural and political life"). But cf.
Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985) (it is a "mistaken impression that an
idea or belief cannot be both secular and religious.").
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for the source of inspiration, motivation, or change would be objec-
tionable on the ground that it reflects secular humanism, a reli-
gious system antithetical to some employees' religious beliefs. Con-
cepts such as honesty, discipline, hard work, or obedience to
authority would also be religious or secular, depending on the indi-
vidual and the nature of his or her belief system. Under these cir-
cumstances, the only factor distinguishing religious from nonreli-
gious beliefs or values is whether the individual declares them to
be the product of a religious or nonreligious source.
Sports & Health Club, Inc. 8 illustrates the difficulty of distin-
guishing the religious from the nonreligious in the employment
context. No one would quarrel with an employer's general right to
hire employees who possess "teachable spirits" and follow "disci-
plined lifestyles,"9 9 however defined; nor is there any general pro-
hibition upon management requiring compliance with work rules
in a "cheerful and obedient spirit." The framing of these require-
ments in religious terms created objection. Similarly, in Blalock,
the general right of an employer to terminate an employee because
of a deterioration in personal rapport was unquestioned; the reli-
gious nature of the disagreements causing this deterioration re-
sulted in the problem.100 Had the same issues been labeled "moral"
or "personal," no cause of action would have existed.
One response to this dilemma might be to use a more restrictive
definition of religion for employment discrimination statutes than
for first amendment questions.' 0' Assuming that some agreement
98. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
99. Obviously, if these employment criteria were a mere subterfuge for discrimination on
the basis of the employee's religious affiliation or identity, a different question would be
presented. See infra text accompanying notes 147-149.
100. Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 708-09 (6th Cir. 1985).
101. Precedent for the idea of a differing definition of religion, depending on the term's
use, can be found in the first amendment area, where some commentators advocate different
definitions of religion for the free exercise and establishment clauses. See L. Trme, AmER-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 (1st ed. 1978); Note, supra note 84, at 1084. But cf. Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (" 'Religion' appears
only once in the [First] Amendment... It does not have two meanings, one narrow to
forbid 'an establishment' and another, much broader, for securing 'the free exercise
thereof.' ").
Most courts that have considered the question have assumed that first amendment defini-
tions of religion apply to questions arising under Title VII. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Ansonia
Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985), remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Redmond v. GAF
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about the nature of a more restrictive definition could be reached,
this approach might limit the scope of disparate treatment cases to
more manageable proportions. The approach would, however, also
limit the scope of the religious accommodation cases. Title VII
contains only one reference to "religion" in connection with unlaw-
ful employment practices. 102 Any definition of religion must there-
fore govern cases involving the employer's failure to accommodate
the religious beliefs of the employee, as well as cases involving the
employer's beliefs or practices. A narrow definition of religion
would violate the implicit spirit of the language of the Act, 03 and
would contradict the current administrative interpretation of "reli-
gion" in that context. 04 Problems of parallelism would also result;
Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978); Edwards v. School Bd., 483 F. Supp. 620, 624
(W.D. Va. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981). But see Yott v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejects implicitly the applica-
tion of the Welsh and Seeger definitions in the employment context).
The EEOC has suggested that the definition of religion used in interpreting Title VII
must be coextensive with that of the first amendment:
The Commission has recognized that the protections against religious dis-
crimination under the Act must not conflict with the first amendment as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court.... [T]he Commission has stated that "[i]f 'reli-
gion' were construed more narrowly for Title VII purposes.... then Title VII's
proscription of religious discrimination would conflict with the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause."
... It is clear from the Legislative History of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972 that "[t]he term 'religion' as used in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 encompasses . .. the same concepts as are included in the first amend-
ment.... [Congress] thus intended to protect the same rights in private em-
ployment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State, or local governments."
... Therefore, it is the Commission's view that the protections of the Act
against religious discrimination can be no broader or narrower than the protec-
tions afforded by the first amendment.
Decision No. 85-3, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1883, 1884 (1985) (footnotes and empha-
sis deleted). The legislative history to which the Commission refers includes statements
made by Senator Randolph at the time of the introduction of Sec. 701(j). See 118 CONG.
REc. 705 (1972), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92ND CONG., 2D
SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 713
(1972).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). See supra note 37.
103. The Act clearly contemplates expansive protection in the accommodation area, stat-
ing that "[t]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). See supra note 45.
104. In response to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the EEOC
defined religion to be "moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are
sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views." See supra note 87.
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if a narrower definition of religion were used to establish a plain-
tiff's prima facie case, it would also have to be used to establish the
defenses of business necessity,105 bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion,106 or the religious organization 07 or religious educational in-
stitution'08 exemptions under the Act. A narrower definition of re-
ligion, particularly as applied to the religious organization and
educational institution exemptions, would undoubtedly encounter
strong establishment clause and equal protection clause
challenges.10 9
Even if the definition of religion were restricted in employment
discrimination cases to the more traditionally recognized religious
beliefs," 0 and such restriction did not conflict with the underlying
source of the equal employment guarantee," other problems re-
main. Focus on the religious or nonreligious source of employment
policies or practices as the determining factor for their legitimacy
would lead to inherently arbitrary results. If a particular hiring cri-
terion, such as disciplined lifestyle, had a religious source, it would
be prohibited; if, on the other hand, it were merely an exercise of
secular subjectivity, it would not."' If the Bible were used as the
employer's "business manual," and as an expression of the em-
ployer's religious convictions, its use would be a prohibited prac-
105. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
106. See supra text accompanying note 49.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. Courts that have considered this exemp-
tion and the religious educational institution exemption, see supra text accompanying notes
61-62, have used concepts of "religion" that were developed in the first amendment context.
See, e.g., Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1026-27 (D. Utah
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
109. The reverse side of this coin would be applying broad first amendment definitions to
these statutory exemptions. Such application would seem to make the exemptions poten-
tially all-encompassing and unworkable.
110. See, e.g., Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
("only religious beliefs which are part of a recognized creed are protected"), vacated on
other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
111. Employment discrimination cases based on the equal protection clause presumably
would require a definition derived from constitutional jurisprudence. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
112. Subjective employment criteria are not per se violations of Title VII, see Ward v.
Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980), although they are carefully
scrutinized to be sure that they are not pretexts for discriminatory practices. See Nanty v.
Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981).
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tice; if, on the other hand, it were used solely as a secular aid, it
would not.11 The clear permissibility of "nonreligious" moral val-
ues or work rules in other contexts underscores the current deter-
minative role of the religious source in identifying prohibited
practices.1 4
Determining the permissibility of work rules, employment phi-
losophies, or hiring criteria according to the nature of their source
is not only difficult and necessarily arbitrary, it is also discrimina-
tory. If the sole reason for the permissibility of particular beliefs or
values is their secular or religious source, one can certainly make a
facially compelling case that religious individuals and institutions
are being denied equal protection of the laws.1 5
113. Cf. Canavan, supra note 89, at 36:
The state, under our Constitution, is not permitted to enforce the Ten Com-
mandments on the ground that they have been revealed by God. On the other
hand, the state is not barred from enforcing certain principles of the Ten Com-
mandments for the reason that some of its citizens believe that they have been
revealed by God.
Id.
114. See, e.g., Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965
(1983); Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Chi-
cago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Allen v. City of Greensboro,
452 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir. 1971) (character and conduct requirements of police depart-
ments); Sullivan v. Meade Indep. School Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976); An-
drews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1975) (standards of
character and morality required of school teachers); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F.
Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Harvey v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (conduct requirements for those involved
in work with children). Even when the moral inquiries or requirements have no apparent
connection to the job to be performed, the courts have recognized that the law presents no
general prohibition against such employment criteria as long as they do not run afoul of
other legal or constitutional guarantees. See Hoilenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F.
Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (dismissal of library employees on the ground of living in "open
adultery" upheld, on the ground that it violates no constitutional or statutory right), aff'd,
578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). Such guarantees might be statu-
tory prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race or sex. See City of Chicago, 549
F.2d 415; Chambers, 629 F. Supp. 925, and Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F.
Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971). The guarantee can also be a constitutional prohibition against
denial of equal protection. See, e.g., Andrews, 507 F.2d 611. If discrimination on some pro-
tected basis is shown, the employer must prove that the requirement is rationally related to
some valid employment objective and that reasonable alternative means are not available.
See Andrews, 507 F.2d at 614-16; Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 949-50.
115. "[T]he State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe.'" School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting
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Christian fundamentalists, of the type involved in Sports &
Health Club, Inc., Blalock, and Young, present the most extreme
cases because of the all-pervasive, uncompromising and (to some)
unpopular nature of their views. Their belief that religion cannot
be separated from secular activities, and that the religious impera-
tive transcends conflicting governmental norms, presents a disqui-
eting challenge to the larger social and governmental order. The
extreme implications of their views, however, should not detract
from the fundamental issues that their claims present. These is-
sues affect any individual or organization-whether Christian, Jew-
ish, Moslem, or any other religious orientation-that refuses to ac-
cept a complete dichotomy between the religious and secular
spheres of life, and therefore attempts to implement religious be-
liefs or practices in the workplace. For many individuals, the reli-
gious and the nonreligious are not easily separable, in theory or in
daily life. Our diverse religious traditions have long informed con-
cepts of public morality and acceptable private conduct.116 Those
traditions, no less than explicitly secular conceptions of public or
private good, can and should be expressed in the workplaces where
most people spend the majority of their lives. The idea that reli-
gious speech, religious values, or religious practices cannot be a
part of the workplace contradicts our own experience of the par-
tial, if not complete, identity of the religious and the nonreligious
spheres. It also deprives the workplace of one of the richest sources
of humane values and conduct. " To say that employment deci-
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). Cf. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479
U.S. 60 (1986) (granting of paid employee leave for nonreligious purposes but denying it for
religious ones constitutes "a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis
of reasonableness."); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2869-70 (1987) ("laws discriminating among
religions are subject to strict scrutiny"; laws that benefit all religions, and that pass estab-
lishment clause challenge, need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental ob-
jective). Query whether a law that imposes uniform disabilities on religious beliefs or prac-
tices falls under the strict scrutiny or rational relationship analysis.
116. See generally Leedes, Taking the Bible Seriously, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 311
(1987).
117. "[D]enial or marginalization of the spiritual dimension of existence" denies "the
human need for deep and lasting emotional commitments embodied for most people in the
idea of family, and ... for continuous forms of community rooted in an ethical vision of a
good and decent way of life." Gabel, Creationism and the Spirit of Nature, 2 TiKKUN, No.
5, at 55, 59 (1986).
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sions made on the basis of neutral principles of economic utility
are acceptable, but that those made on the basis of religious values
and traditions are not, is inherently arbitrary and poor public
policy.
Some approach, other than the attempted eradication of the reli-
gious from the workplace, must be found to resolve the conflict be-
tween the employee's right to equal employment opportunity, and
the employer's right to the implementation of religious values. A
proposal for the adjustment of these conflicting claims is set forth
below.
III. THE ADJUSTMENT OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS: A PROPOSAL
Religion is unique among the prohibited classifications found in
Title VII and other civil rights statutes. Only religious speech, ex-
ercise, and expression have intrinsic, societally recognized and con-
stitutionally enunciated value. At best, racist speech is constitu-
tionally tolerated; the practice of racism, in employment or
elsewhere, "violates deeply and widely accepted views of elemen-
tary justice.""1 8 The same can be said of practices that involve sex-
ism or discrimination on the basis of national origin. Religion is
different. Although the elimination of religious discrimination in
employment is a matter of the highest public policy, that goal
must be achieved in a manner that is cognizant of the explicit, af-
firmative value of religious speech, practice, and expression by all
parties-employers as well as employees.
Religious discrimination claims are also unique, in that the em-
ployee's assertion of his or her rights constitutes the potential in-
fringement upon the identical rights of the employer. The first
amendment and the civil rights laws protect an individual's right
to irreligion, as well as religious beliefs or practices." 9 The mirror
image of the assertion of rights by one party is therefore the denial
of the rights of the other. The employee's asserted right to be free
of an offensive, religiously permeated work environment becomes
118. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983) (discussing racial discrim-
ination in education).
119. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); see supra text accompanying
note 79.
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the denial of the employer's right to exercise its religious beliefs. 120
Reciprocal protection means, in the case of a religious employer,
inevitable violation.
The existence of these conflicting claims is unavoidable. The
question is how they should be resolved in the particular context of
the application of the civil rights laws. A claim of employment dis-
crimination resting on an employee's objection to an employer's re-
ligious beliefs or practices requires a bipartite analysis. A court
must first determine whether the employer's actions constitute dis-
crimination on the basis of religion; and second, if so, whether they
are protected by statutory exemptions or constitutional guaran-
tees. The second half of this inquiry has received much attention;
almost none has been given to the first. The thesis of this Article is
that the primary resolution of these conflicting claims should be
made within the first inquiry.
Religious discrimination cases tend to fall into four broad
categories:
1. Claims involving a conflict between a nonreligious work en-
vironment, or an employer's nonreligious employment require-
ments, and an employee's religious beliefs. In these cases, the em-
ployee seeks exemption from "neutral" work rules because of their
incompatibility with his or her religious beliefs. 12 1 These cases are
based on statutes such as section 701(j) of Title VII, which re-
quires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's reli-
gious observances or practices unless that accommodation would
create an undue hardship on the employer's business.122
2. Claims based on the employer's refusal to hire, promote, or
otherwise provide equal terms or conditions of employment be-
120. The situation is much like the tension between the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment, such that state-required accommodation of individual free
exercise is seen as an "establishment" of religion in violation of the establishment clause.
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2595
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have not yet come close to reconciling [the prohibition
upon intentional governmental advancement of religion in] Lemon and our Free Exercise
cases, and typically we do not really try.").
121. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (em-
ployee plaintiff, a member of the Sikh religion, was unable to comply with the defendant's
grooming requirements).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). See supra note 45.
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cause of the employee's religious affiliation or identity. These
cases, which are generally brought under a disparate treatment
theory, include an employer's failure to promote individuals who
are not "born-again Christians" into management positions, 12 3 fail-
ure to offer a lawyer partnership because he is a Catholic,124 failure
to hire a college professor because he is not a Jesuit, 2 5 or failure to
hire a helicopter pilot because he will not convert to the Moslem
religion. 126 In all of these cases, the employer's acts allegedly are
based on the plaintiff's religious or nonreligious status.
3. Claims based on the existence of a work environment or a
work atmosphere that reflects hostility to the employee's religion
or religious beliefs. These cases, based on a theory of religious har-
assment, are brought under a disparate treatment theory. They
often involve an intimidating or offensive work environment, such
as one that involves repeated religious comments or slurs. 27 In
these cases, the religious beliefs or status of the employee remain
the focus of the employer's action.
4. Claims based on the religious beliefs, practices, or values of
the employer. In these cases, the employer's beliefs or practices are
offensive to the employee or contrary to the employee's religious or
nonreligious beliefs. Examples include the employer's implementa-
tion of religiously derived work rules or requirements, the em-
ployer's open discussion of religious faith in employment decisions,
and the conduct of religious services or practices as a part of the
workplace environment or regimen. These cases may be brought
under a disparate treatment theory, in which the employee directly
attacks the religiously permeated workplace as inherently discrimi-
natory. 28 Alternatively, these cases may be framed in terms of the
123. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847, (Minn. 1985), dismissed for
lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
124. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. Pime v. Loyola University, 585 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Mll. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1986).
126. Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) aff'd, 746 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984); Reichman
v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1174-76 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
128. See, e.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dis-
missed for lack of juris. 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703
(6th Cir. 1985). See also Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766
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religious employer's failure to accommodate the employee's reli-
gious or nonreligious beliefs. 1 9
A valid claim of religious discrimination in employment should
be limited to situations in which the employee's religious status
(religious affiliation or identity, or lack thereof) is the reason for
the employer's action. Further relief should be available only when
the employee seeks exemption from the employer's work rules or
requirements under a statutorily mandated accommodations anal-
ysis. In that instance, although the employee is not treated differ-
ently because of his or her religious status, that status remains the
focus of the claim. Cases that are not based on the employee's reli-
gious status, or that do not fall within the statutorily established
accommodations exception to that general requirement, should not
state a claim for religious discrimination under the civil rights
laws.
The goal of Title VII is "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate in-
vidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissi-
ble classifications." 30 The purpose of other state statutes and mu-
nicipal ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employment is
likewise to afford all employees and prospective employees equal
employment opportunity. In the case of discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, or national origin, the denial of equal employment op-
portunity on the basis of the plaintiff's status is the target of the
legislation.' 3 ' The prohibition against discrimination on the basis
F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1985) (sex discrimination claim based upon the employer's religiously
based belief that the mother of young children should be in the home), rev'd on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
130. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 425, 431 (1971). In the words of Senator Muskie,
the purpose of the Act is to "eliminate all obstacles to equal opportunity." 110 CoNG. REc.
12,619 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF THE CIVHL
RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3098 (1968).
131. Senators Clark and Case were the floor managers for H.R. 7152, which contained
what later became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In an interpretative memoran-
dum, they stated:
* , * [S]ection 704 prohibits discrimination in employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. It has been suggested that the concept of
discrimination is vague. In fact[,] it is clear and simple and has no hidden
meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor
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of religion should be similarly limited. 132 "Discrimination on the
basis of religion" should mean that the employer has subjected an
employee or potential employee to differing treatment, or disad-
vantage, because of his or her religious affiliation or identity, or has
failed to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious or non-
religious beliefs. In either situation, the employee's religious affilia-
tion or beliefs, or lack thereof, is the focus of the complaint. The
reasons for the employer's hostility to the employee's religious sta-
tus, or for its choice of work requirements or work rules, is irrele-
vant to the plaintiff's claim.13 3
Under these principles, cases in the first category above-those
in which a nonreligious work environment, or an employer's non-
religious employment criteria, conflict with an employee's religious
requirements-state a claim of religious discrimination under a
statute that mandates an employer's accommodation of an em-
ployee's religious beliefs or practices.13 4 Cases within the second
category above do as well. If an employer treats an individual dif-
ferently because of his or her religious affiliation or identity, that
individual may assert a claim of religious status discrimination. In
such a case, the employee is ready, willing, and able to perform the
job at issue; his or her religious affiliation or identity is, from the
employee's point of view, irrelevant. The differing treatment that
the employee receives at the hands of the employer, because of the
employee's religious affiliation or identity, however, creates the
problem. This treatment clearly constitutes discrimination on the
which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any [of the]
five ... forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any
other criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title.
110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964), reprinted in id. at 3042-43.
132. During the House debate on § 703(a)(2) of Title VII, which permits church-affiliated
schools and colleges to hire employees of a particular religion, the participants appeared to
assume that "religious discrimination" referred to religious affiliation and religious beliefs.
See 110 CONG. REc. 2585-93, reprinted in EEOC, supra note 130, at 3197-212.
133. The reasons for the employer's actions could be relevant to the employer's defense,
such as business necessity, bona fide occupational qualification, or undue hardship under a
statutorily mandated accommodations analysis.
134. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). See supra note 45.
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basis of religion, and is within the contemplated prohibition of the
civil rights laws .1 5
Cases falling within the third and fourth categories-those based
on the existence of a work environment or work atmosphere that
reflects hostility to the employee's religion or religious beliefs, and
those based on religious beliefs, practices, or values of the em-
ployer that are offensive to the employee-are more complex. In
both cases, the legal touchstone must be whether the employer de-
nies the employee or prospective employee equal terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of his or her religious status.
A claim for discrimination on the basis of religion clearly exists
when the employee's religious affiliation or identity is the subject
of the employer's overt hostility, such as when the employee or his
religion is the target of derogatory comments or religious slurs.
Under these circumstances, the employer denies the employee
equal terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of his
or her religious status.
A different situation is presented if the employee's religious affil-
iation or identity is not the focus of overt hostility. Whether the
incompatibility of the employee's religious or nonreligious beliefs
with those of superiors or coworkers presents a claim for discrimi-
nation on the basis of religious status depends on the closeness of
the particular belief in issue to the definition of religious affiliation
or identity. If the belief in question is critical to the definition of
the employee's religious affiliation or identity,136 then the em-
ployer's action on the basis of that belief would present a claim for
religious discrimination because the professed basis for the em-
ployer's action is a subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of
religious status.3 7 However, when the particular belief is not criti-
cal to the employee's religious affiliation or identity, the incompati-
bility of that belief with those of the employer would be actionable
only under a statutorily defined accommodations analysis. The role
135. If the employer requires a particular religious affiliation or identity, then the legiti-
macy of that requirement must be tested under the standards for business necessity or for a
bona fide occupational qualifications. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
136. An example would be the employee's belief, or absence of belief, in the existence of
God.
137. The defenses of business necessity and bona fide occupational qualification would, of
course, remain available to the employer. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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of the employer's religious beliefs in its actions would, in either
situation, be irrelevant.
Refusal to predicate a claim for religious discrimination solely on
the existence of an employer's religious policies, practices, or be-
liefs accords with the purpose of the civil rights laws. Statutes
prohibiting discrimination in employment do not mandate the cre-
ation of a religiously neutral work environment. Indeed, such a
work environment would be almost, if not entirely, impossible to
achieve. 138 The issue should not be whether religiously based or re-
ligiously motivated beliefs or values (however defined) are motivat-
ing the employer's actions; rather, it should be whether the em-
ployee's employment opportunities are curtailed because of his or
her religious affiliation or identity. Employment actions or require-
ments that have a religious motivation or source should not be for-
bidden as long as they are applied equally to all, and all have equal
opportunity and ability to meet those requirements. The issue
should be whether the employee has equal opportunity to meet the
requirements for employment, whatever they are-not whether the
employer's requirements are those which the employee would
choose, or with which he or she personally agrees.
Employee complaints regarding exposure to allegedly offensive
values, policies, or practices are analogous to first amendment
cases involving parental objection to "secularized" public school
curricula. In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,3 9
the plaintiffs contended that the use of a prescribed set of reading
textbooks in the public schools violated their right to the free exer-
cise of religion protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
They argued that the textbooks contained beliefs and values, such
as the acceptance of evolution, "secular humanism," "futuristic su-
pernaturalism," and pacifism, which were offensive to their funda-
mentalist Christian beliefs. The question was "whether a govern-
mental requirement that a person be exposed to ideas he or she
finds objectionable on religious grounds constitutes a burden on
the free exercise of that person's religion."'I4 The court rejected
this contention, stating:
138. See supra notes 73-117 and accompanying text.
139. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 1029 (1988).
140. Id. at 1063.
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In Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie there was governmental
compulsion to engage in conduct that violated the plaintiffs' re-
ligions convictions. That element is missing in the present case.
The requirement that students read the assigned materials and
attend reading classes, in the absence of a showing that this par-
ticipation entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or
performance or non-performance of a religious exercise or prac-
tice, does not place an unconstitutional burden on the students'
free exercise of religion.14
1
In Mozert, the court required a finding of compulsion to avoid the
invalidation of any public school curriculum as incompatible with a
particular student's asserted religious or nonreligious beliefs;1 42 it
is similarly required to avoid the invalidation of virtually any work
environment under the religious discrimination provisions of the
civil rights laws. Exemption from religious work rules or exposure
to an religious work atmosphere should be limited to those situa-
tions when the employee is entitled to relief under a statutorily
defined accommodations analysis. 14 3
141. Id. at 1065; cf. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
142. 827 F.2d at 1064; see Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1542 (9th
Cir.) (Camby, J., concurring) ("Were the free exercise clause violated whenever governmen-
tal activity is offensive to or at variance with sincerely held religious precepts, virtually no
governmental program would be constitutionally possible."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826
(1985).
143. Title VII requires an employer to accommodate an employee's religious or nonreli-
gious beliefs or practices only if the accommodation would impose a de minimis burden
upon the employer. See supra note 50. When the beliefs are religious in nature, the courts
have clearly held that the employer need not remake the workplace to accommodate them.
In Ali v. Southeast Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1981), the plaintiff
sought accommodation of far-reaching religious beliefs. The court held that this accommo-
dation would impose an unnecessary burden upon the employer, stating:
Ali would impose his personal perception, from conscience, religion, or philoso-
phy, on each and every day-to-day aspect of his employment while ignoring the
basic responsibilities of that position....
Ali's religious beliefs enveloped every facet of his life, personal or business. It
must be evident that in [the defendant's] employment no "reasonable accom-
modation," indeed, no accommodation at all, could make way for those reli-
gious beliefs as Ali envisioned them .... Only a complete reversal of the em-
ployer-employee roles, with Ali in the former, rather than the latter, might
provide the plaintiff the absolute power he requires to satisfy those beliefs.
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These standards would require an entirely different analysis in
the Sports & Health Club, Inc. case.144 The religious basis of de-
fendants' actions would be irrelevant to the question of whether, in
the first instance, discrimination on the basis of religion oc-
curred.145 Rather, the question would be whether the defendants'
actions deprived the complaining parties of equal employment op-
portunity because of religious status (religious affiliation or iden-
tity). The employer's practice of restricting managerial positions to
persons who were born-again Christians would constitute discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion, because it represented status dis-
crimination on the basis of the employee's religious affiliation or
identity. Pre-employment questions, or the defendants' work rules,
would be evaluated individually to determine if they were a subter-
fuge for religious status discrimination.146 In this connection, the
diverse backgrounds and religious affiliations of individuals the de-
fendants employed would be relevant in determining whether the
Accommodation is not abdication. Title VII cannot and will not be so
construed.
Id. at 496-97. When the situation is reversed, and the employee is asserting protection for
nonreligious beliefs, there is no reason for imposing a greater burden upon the employer.
144. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). The
completely unworkable nature of the Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to that case is
apparent in the scope of the injunction it enforced. In a sweeping effort to "eradicate" reli-
gion from the workplace, the court prohibited the defendants from refusing to hire any
person because of that person's religious beliefs or practices (no matter how unreasonable or
offensive those beliefs or practices might be to management, fellow workers, or business
customers); refusing to hire any person because of that person's objection or hostility to the
defendants' religious beliefs or practices, or to the religious beliefs or practices of any other
employee (thus requiring the defendants to hire persons who treat their beliefs, or those of
fellow employees, with derision or contempt); and "taking any adverse action against any
employee because of that employee's religious beliefs or practices" (presumably, an em-
ployee could define his or her "religious beliefs or practices" any way that he or she desired,
and could foist absolute accommodation of those beliefs upon the employer). Id. at 867 n.25
(Peterson, J., dissenting).
145. The religious basis of the defendants' actions would be relevant to the availability of
statutory or constitutional defenses. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
146. Pre-employment questions of a religious nature, such as whether the applicant at-
tended church, read the Bible, prayed or believed in heaven or hell, would be the most
suspect, if evidence suggested that "incorrect" answers to these questions led to a refusal to
hire. If, however, applicants of all persuasions were given equal employment opportunity as
long as they exhibited the "teachable spirits" and "disciplined lifestyles" required, and were
not offended by the defendants' views, the religious basis of these qualities or of the defend-
ants' views would be irrelevant.
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defendants' religiously based employment criteria or work rules
were a subterfuge for religious status discrimination.
The existence of religious speech or practices by the employer
should be treated similarly. The holding of Bible studies, as in
Sports & Health Club, Inc., or religious devotions, as in Young, or
weekly religious meetings, as in Decision No. 72-0528 of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 147 should not, in them-
selves, be discriminatory practices. If employees of any religious
faith are allowed to attend, no active participation is required, and
no inquiry is made as to employees' personal agreement or disa-
greement with the religious truth of the proceedings, no discrimi-
natory practice has occurred. Religious speech by employers or su-
pervisors also would not be a discriminatory practice per se. The
open discussion of religious views by the employer in Sports &
Health Club, Inc. and by the supervisor in Decision No. 72-1114 of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,4 8 would not
constitute a discriminatory practice in the absence of objective evi-
dence that it was an indirect attempt to deprive the employee of
equal terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis
of religious status. Findings that an employee "subjectively" felt
intimidated by this, and that he or she "erroneously or not" be-
lieved that his or her job security could be affected, would be in-
sufficient. 49 If such an employee were entitled to relief, it would be
under the theory (with all of the statutory limitations) that the
employer failed to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs. 150
Arguably a broad concept of religious discrimination causes no
damage to the employer's legitimate interests, because those inter-
ests are protected by defenses based on the first amendment and,
in the case of Title VII, the sections 702 and 703 exemptions. How-
ever, even if a court found the employer's actions to be the exercise
of religion under existing constitutional tests, the free exercise
clause does not provide automatic protection. Only religious exer-
cise not outweighed by compelling state interests is constitution-
147. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
149. See id.
150. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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ally protected.15' The state's interest in eradicating discrimination
in employment may outweigh free exercise claims. 152 Statutory ex-
emptions, such as sections 702 and 703, are confined to the em-
ployment decisions of religious organizations and, possibly, to the
nonprofit activities of those organizations.' 5" None of these de-
fenses would answer the problems created by an overly inclusive
definition of employment discrimination on the basis of religion in
the first instance.
Two objections could be made to this approach to religious dis-
crimination claims. First, one could argue that religiously derived
employment criteria or work rules may serve as a mere subterfuge
for discrimination on the basis of an employee's religious affiliation
or identity.15 4 Religiously based employment requirements, like
any other employment requirements, that function as a means for
the accomplishment of status discrimination obviously should be
forbidden.' 55 Presumably, courts would be as capable of determin-
ing the existence of pretext or subterfuge in this context as they
are in any other. The possibility that employers may use relig-
iously based requirements or work rules, like those with any other
philosophic basis, in an illegal manner does not justify their pro-
phylactic prohibition.
151. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220
(1972); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2596 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
It is well established that "[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to
religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by
the Free Exercise Clause." . . . We have implied that voluntary governmental
accommodation of religion is not only permissible, but desirable.... Thus, few
would contend that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both for-
bids religious discrimination by private-sector employers ... and requires them
reasonably to accommodate the religious practices of their employees ... vio-
lates the Establishment Clause, even though its "purpose" is, of course, to ad-
vance religion, and even though it is almost certainly not required by the Free
Exercise Clause.
152. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (governmental interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education outweighs right to free exercise of religious
beliefs).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
154. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 146.
155. This type of discrimination could arise in the form of pretext in a case based on
disparate treatment, or in the form of disparate impact of facially neutral criteria on a pro-
tected group. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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Definition of religious discrimination in terms of the status of
the individual would not restrict inquiry into the methods, guises,
or other means by which such discrimination might be effected.
The courts have on occasion been reluctant to define the phrase,
for fear that any definition would result in failure to meet the va-
ried and subtle ways that such discrimination might be accom-
plished.156 Latitude in proof of unlawful methods or means of ac-
complishing unlawful discrimination is not, however, incompatible
with a definite or limited concept of what in fact constitutes the
alleged discrimination. Litigants and courts have been successful in
exposing pretext and proving disparate impact in connection with
discrimination on the basis of other kinds of protected status; dis-
crimination on the basis of religion would not be any more difficult
to prove.One could also argue that religiously based work rules or re-
quirements, or the existence of religious workplace practices, may
have the practical effect of status discrimination because employ-
ees-due to their own religious requirements-may be unable to
meet them. Upon scrutiny, however, this objection also lacks sub-
stance. An employee's inability to achieve equal employment op-
portunity, due to the employer's exclusion of persons with the em-
ployee's religious affiliation or identity, is unlawful discrimination
which, in the absence of a valid defense, should be sanctionable.
However, a case involving an employee's inability to comply with
the employer's requirements due to the employee's own determina-
tion that those requirements are incompatible with the tenets of
his or her religion, is simply like any other case in which the em-
ployer is asked to accommodate the employee's religious practices
or beliefs.' 57
156. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp.
1004, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), reu'd on other grounds, 477
U.S. 619 (1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently shared this concern. See Sports
& Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 n.16 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris.,
478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
157. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). See also Note, Reli-
gious Discrimination and Title VII's Reasonable Accommodations Rule: Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1978); Note, Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.: Can
the Government Require Accommodation of Religion at the Private Job Site?, 62 VA. L.
REv. 237 (1976).
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If "discrimination on the basis of religion," when a part of the
plaintiff's case, is limited to discrimination on the basis of religious
status, a question arises whether the employer's statutory defenses,
which utilize this concept, are limited as well. 158 Because a defense
of business necessity or bona fide occupational qualification is a
mirror image of the plaintiff's charge, the employer would have to
assert valid reasons why the plaintiff's religious status (affiliation
or identity) was necessary to safe and efficient job performance,
had a manifest relationship to the job in question, or substantially
promoted the proficient operation of the business. 159 As such, the
defense would be severely limited. Where non-Moslems flying heli-
copters into Mecca are executed if caught, an employer can assert
that Moslem religious affiliation is legitimately linked to job per-
formance.160 The employment of a teacher who reflects a particular
religious tradition, in training and in personal identity, by a relig-
iously affiliated school might be another example.' 6 ' The outer
boundaries of such cases, however, must be carefully circum-
scribed. If the employer's self-definition and its definition of the
job were sufficient, alone, to establish a bona fide occupational
qualification, there would be no limit to permissible discrimination
on the basis of religious status. Any claim that a particular reli-
gious affiliation or religious identity is a requirement for job per-
formance must be subject to the court's independent assessment.'62
Defenses under sections 702 and 703 of Title VII are more prob-
lematic. Both sections permit religious organizations or institutions
to discriminate on the basis of religion with regard to some or all
158. The employer's constitutional defenses, of course, would remain a distinct and sepa-
rate issue. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
160. See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), afl'd, 746 F.2d
810 (5th Cir. 1984).
161. See Pime v. Loyola Univ., 585 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1986), in which the court held that preference of a Jesuit for a teaching position in the
university's department of philosophy was permissible, because the university held itself out
to the public as a Jesuit and Catholic institution of higher learning, and members of the
Society of Jesus receive unique training and experience which is necessary for the continu-
ance of a "Jesuit presence." Id. at 443.
162. For instance, courts should reject employer claims based upon religious stereotypes
or customer preference. See Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570, 1579
(S.D. Tex. 1984); Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1201.
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employees. 163 When the plaintiff claims that he or she is the victim
of discrimination on another basis (sex, race, or national origin),
employers have sought an interpretation of religious discrimination
that is broader than decision making based upon an employee's
religious affiliation or identity."" Courts addressing this issue have
generally rejected a broader reading of these exemptions.1 Sub-
stantial legislative history indicates that congressional concern
about the autonomy of religious organizations led to the enactment
and subsequent amendment of these sections.166 Sufficient protec-
tion of the first amendment rights of religious institutions and or-
ganizations, as embodied in sections 702 and 703, may justify a
broader understanding of discrimination in that context.1 7 To the
163. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
164. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
aff'd, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (restriction of health insurance to male "heads of house-
hold" claimed to be an exercise of the employer's religious beliefs, and therefore religious
discrimination protected by § 702); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Iowa 1980) (discharge of pregnant, unmarried teacher by a Roman Catholic High School
claimed to be based on the moral and religious precepts of the Roman Catholic Church, and
thus within § 702).
165. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980) (section
702 would apply if the district court determined, on remand, that the College's action was
an application of its policy of preferring Baptists over non-Baptists in faculty hiring), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. at 350 (religious school
is entitled "to hire only members of its faith for teaching positions and the like, but may
not, under the § 702 exemption, discriminate against its employees thereafter."); Dolter, 483
F. Supp. at 269 n.2 (section 702 interpreted to apply only to actions based upon the em-
ployee's religious affiliation: "Wahlert High School does not contend that Ms. Dolter was
discharged because she was not a Catholic.... Nor does Wahlert High School contend that
her alleged violation of Catholic moral precepts caused her to be excommunicated or other-
wise expelled from membership in the Catholic Church. The court, therefore, notes that at
all times material Ms. Dolter was, and continues to be, a Roman Catholic."). The proper
scope of these exemptions has been extended to include questions about the content of reli-
gious doctrine or the meaning of religious affiliation, as well as the fact of affiliation. See
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, 1503 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (section 703(e)(2)
precludes court inquiry into whether plaintiff "is or is not a Catholic," because of her be-
liefs), afl'd, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987); Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 966 (D.
Utah 1980) (restriction of § 703(e)(2) exemption to "preference for those ostensibly affiliated
with the religion ... ignores both reason and policy"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). Cf.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (if a religious institution presents convincing evidence
that a challenged employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of religion,
§ 702 deprives the EEOC of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine if the religious
discrimination was a pretext for another form of discrimination).
166. See supra note 60.
167. See Note, supra note 59.
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extent that these concerns are present in cases involving the em-
ployee's right to be free of religious discrimination, they militate
against a broad definition of discrimination.
The elimination of discrimination on the basis of religion, like
the elimination of all barriers to equal employment opportunity, is
a goal of the highest priority. It should not, however, require the
elimination of the religious from the workplace or the artificial sev-
erance of our religious and secular lives. Religious, as well as non-
religious, persons and institutions in our society should be given
recognition and proper protection. During congressional debate on
the exemption for religious education institutions that now appears
in Title VII, Congressman Gary stated:
We are talking about rights in this bill. I believe we ought to
respect the rights of all of our people. I do not believe we should
pass legislation aimed solely at rights for a certain group or class
of people. I believe it should protect the rights of all the people
of the United States. 168
Restricting valid claims of religious employment discrimination
to those involving discrimination on the basis of the employee's
religious status would serve these rights. The restriction would pre-
serve the employee's right to be free of artificial barriers to equal
employment opportunity. It would relieve the state, through its
civil rights laws, of the hopeless and arbitrary task of distinguish-
ing religious from nonreligious work rules or employment philoso-
phies, with the same policy, belief, or practice sanctioned or con-
demned according to its source. It would also avoid what otherwise
is, in essence, invidious discrimination against the religious in
human affairs.
CONCLUSION
The state cannot and should not be in the position of choosing
between permissible or impermissible values or philosophic sys-
tems, based upon their religious or nonreligious source. The eradi-
cation of religious values from the workplace-the guarantee of a
''religiously neutral" work environment-was never intended by
the civil rights laws. Indeed, the broad definition of religion re-
168. 110 CONG. REc. 2592 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, supra note 130, at 3210.
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quired by our pluralistic society would make this an impossible
task, fraught with discriminatory potential. No work rule, employ-
ment philosophy, or personal philosophy is "value free." Value
judgments involve moral choices; moral choice is an essential com-
ponent of religious systems. The workplace, as a small reflection of
the larger society of which it is a part, cannot be isolated or torn
from the larger social fabric. Private decision making cannot avoid
the larger identity of values, moral choices, and religious beliefs. As
Richard John Neuhaus recently stated:
In law, in political theory, in education, and in the sciences it
is increasingly recognized that few judgments of consequence are
value-neutral. The myth of value-neutrality... invites the dom-
inance of a sterile secularism that is hostile to moral debate and
religious belief. ... The public philosophy that is needed must
be based upon a political ethic that is informed by our religious
traditions. 169
Laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment must be
interpreted in a manner that recognizes the legitimacy of religious
values and practice, and that targets the valid purpose of those
laws: the eradication of barriers to equal employment opportunity
due to religious status discrimination.
169. Speech delivered by R.J. Neuhaus, American Jewish Committee's National Conven-
tion, Washington, D.C. (May 16, 1986), reprinted in Leedes, supra note 116, at 313.
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